Introduction
The aim of this paper is to offer a critique of the proposal of "methodological cosmopolitanism" in theoretical terms and to substantiate this critique by providing an account of the dynamics of collective memory and identity in postunification Germany. The methodological cosmopolitanism thesis makes a strong challenge to analytical frameworks that take for granted the grid of the nation state, for instance by supposing that the study of society or politics at least starts, and possibly ends, with the study of national societies or nation-state politics. The study of collective memory, it has been asserted, has suffered from this defect of misplaced "methodological nationalism," and the example of Holocaust memory has been invoked to demonstrate a cosmopolitanization of memory that displays the necessity of methodological cosmopolitanism.
But we argue that the example of Holocaust memory when looked at more closely carries quite different lessons. It shows in fact the role of national identity and its processes of formation and mutation in the so-called cosmopolitanization of Holocaust memory. The latter development, which we agree to have been underway for some time, cannot be fully understood without invoking the analytical grid of the nation state, in the form of official German national identity and memory discourse.
Indeed, the process of cosmopolitanization in this case has as its necessary complement a process of "decosmopolitanization" or "renationalization" of German identity. The example points towards a more nuanced understanding of the interplay between cosmopolitan and national memory, which involves an appreciation of the durability, even in the face of its constructed nature, of the nation-state and its corresponding identity.
In the first part, we look at the arguments about methodological cosmopolitanism and their derivative, the idea of cosmopolitan memory, illustrated by the case of Holocaust memory. In the second part we look at the case of Germany: firstly at its postwar experience of the attempted construction of "postnational" identity, and then at more recent trends, contemporaneous with the Berlin Republic, towards a "normalization" of national identity in Germany. The Holocaust plays a crucial, but different, role in each phase, we suggest. In the conclusion we return to wider themes, asking what the German case tells us about the cosmopolitanization thesis more generally.
Methodological Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitan Memory of the Holocaust
While cosmopolitanism has a long tradition as a philosophy of ethical universalism, it has recently been promoted by social theorist Ulrich Beck and his colleagues in a new-or ostensibly new-form as a generic outlook for the social sciences. In this section we will begin by focusing attention on a programmatic article by Beck and Natan Sznaider that appeared in the British Journal of Sociology in 2006 and whose significance was affirmed by its republication when the same journal collected its most influential articles in a special issue in 2010. 1 We continue by looking at a contribution by Sznaider and Daniel Levy which develops one of the key claims of the methodological cosmopolitanism proposal-that new conceptual frameworks are needed to describe and evaluate the "cosmopolitan condition"-by making the case for a concept of cosmopolitan memory. 2 Levy and Sznaider illustrate the utility of this concept with the example of Holocaust memory.
Beck and Sznaider make a range of briefly illustrated empirical claims about the "cosmopolitanization of reality" and "cosmopolitan realism," found in:
every field of social and political action: in international organizations, in binational families, in neighbourhoods, in global cities, in transnational military organizations, in the management of multi-national co-operations [sic], in production networks, human rights organizations, among ecology activists and the paradoxical global opposition to globalization. 3 The authors draw from such empirical phenomena the conclusion that the existing or prevailing modes of social science are in need of replacement, because they take for granted or presuppose "that the unit of analysis is the national society or the national state or the combination of both." 4 Existing modes make "methodological nationalism" a "socio-ontological given" whose "basic tenets have become the main perceptual grid of the social sciences." 5 "[N]ational organization," they say, "can no longer serve as the organizing reference point." 6 In so far as these claims correctly identify a thoughtlessness or lack of critical reflection about national societies and polities or a "naturalized conception of nations as real communities," 7 15 From these observations it must indeed follow that the "artificiality" of an identity cannot be an a priori reason for denying the possibility of its sociological realization. So far as collective memory is concerned, this entails accepting, as many writers have, the distinction made by
Maurice Halbwachs between lived and historical memories, or the distinction made by Jan Assmann between those remembered through person-to-person transmission and those memorialized in cultural objectifications. 16 Hence, collective memories become more readily available for use outside the "national container" in which the memorialized events took place. As with Beck and Sznaider's more general proposal of methodological cosmopolitanism, we therefore find here in one of its applications a converse kind of indifference to the stubbornly national aspects of collective memory construction. We now turn for fuller substantiation of this criticism to the case of Germany.
Germany: From Postnational to National Identity
Levy and Sznaider note that in Germany, as in the other countries they consider, the postwar period was one in which the Holocaust did not loom large as a distinct element of the memory of the Nazi period and its atrocities and calamities. One might argue about the depth or authenticity of the postnational identity that seemed to be under construction in postwar Germany, 31 though this is not a mode of argument available to the writers on collective memory we have been considering, for whom arguments asserting national authenticity are precisely examples of the national essentialism they seek to combat. Whatever the depth of the postwar cosmopolitanization, it is hard to dispute the claim that a significant turn in identity discourse occurred after unification. In a nutshell, this discourse defied the claims of the advocates of methodological cosmopolitanism by shifting from postnational to national.
At the same time as Holocaust memory has taken its "cosmopolitan turn," as discussed by Levy and Sznaider, collective memory in Germany has been characterized by a number of other key developments. Since the generational change in German government in 1998 and in particular Gerhard Schröder's accession to the chancellorship, the memory of Germany's Nazi past has been made a lot more palatable. Initiatives undertaken by the Red-Green coalition under Schröder's leadership as of 1998, for example the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and the fund for compensating forced labor, suggested that an acknowledgement of culpability was being translated into practice. 32 It soon became apparent, however, that these moves were coupled with very confident expressions of national identity which contributed to a "normalization" of Germany, unprecedented in the postwar period.
Shortly after coming to power, Schröder, the first German chancellor without a living memory of the Third Reich, articulated a stance on the Nazi past that bridged two previously incompatible positions. Despite unambiguously recognizing German culpability, he did not allow the Nazi past to function as an obstacle to a positive German national identity. In a November 1998 talk show, for example, Schröder declared he planned to represent a Germany that was "less inhibited" and-even more astonishing for a center-left coalition leader-one that was "in a positive sense maybe even more German." 33 For his generation, he provided a novel perspective on the Nazi past and German identity. Whereas positive expressions of national identity had previously been deemed impossible because of Auschwitz, as traditionally argued among the liberal left, or had to be "historicized," as maintained by the right, Schröder attempted to dissolve this tension by promoting an approach that fully acknowledged culpability for crimes committed during the Third Reich, but that did not prevent the articulation of a positive identification with the German nation, and rather confident conduct in general.
In his government declaration of 10 November 1998, Schröder referred to the "self-confidence of a grown-up nation" which felt neither inferior nor superior towards others. He depicted Germany as a nation which faced up to its history and acknowledged the responsibilities arising from it. 34 In a 1999 interview, Schröder further explained that, rather than providing a constraint, the readiness of a new generation to engage with the Nazi past could become empowering, insofar as it created "an opportunity to represent one's own interests in a more uninhibited manner." 35 Schröder clearly promoted further German "normalization," but this was not to happen at the expense of Holocaust memory and German responsibility.
At the same time as Holocaust memory was made more "palatable" for identificatory purposes, the "Germans as victims" discourse returned suddenly and strongly to literary, historical and political debates after the turn of the millennium. over. The denazification process is described as "going too far by some critics and not going far enough by others;" and it is claimed that the country had succeeded in "banning the leading Nazis as a group from political life." Köhler refers to the early postwar reluctance of Germans to discuss the atrocities committed as a "silence on which both victims and perpetrators often agreed," suggesting it might have been "necessary in order for the people to be able to take a step back and start from scratch." 42 In this narrative, German history is not a hindrance but rather offers another opportunity for showcasing the country as a success story: "We see our country in its entire history, which is why we realize how much good there is that we can connect The post-Cold War era and the aftermath of reunification … compelled Germany to find a new political and cultural place in Europe. It did so by pursuing a dual strategy centering the Holocaust as an integral part of national history (see for instance the decade-long debate regarding the memorial in Berlin), and simultaneously decentering it by turning the Holocaust into a European event …
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Here a cui bono argument is clearly implied, and the "who" that benefits is Germany. This is already enough to call into question the precept of methodological cosmopolitanism. To substantiate the claim of a German "strategy" would raise the question even more explicitly, which may in part account for the absence of any attempt to do so on Levy and Sznaider's part. It would in fact be difficult to show the existence of deliberate strategizing about Holocaust memory on the part of German leaders. Nevertheless, our brief survey of their discourse on national identity shows quite clearly the rhetorical advantage the decentering of the Holocaust has for the construction of national collective memory.
We will not have properly understood the process if it is seen only as a disembodied one whereby the memory of the Holocaust comes to serve some general purpose such as a yearning for meaning and moral certitude in the face of globalizing pressures. Germany has been able to offload Holocaust memory, which has indeed become a global phenomenon. With that noxious material expelled from the national container, far from the container "cracking," 46 its refurbishment could proceed. The irony that one has to look at state interests, as expressed with a fair degree of concreteness by high officials, in order to understand properly the process of cosmopolitanization of memory is compounded when one looks at the contrast between such expressions before and after unification, or more specifically the generational change of 1998. Germany has moved away from a cosmopolitan construction of its own identity over this period, towards a more familiar national one. 47 It is a case, at least in part, of "de-cosmopolitanization."
Conclusion: Understanding Cosmopolitanization and the Perils of Methodological Cosmopolitanism
That there exists a real process of cosmopolitanization, that cosmopolitan memory is one of its symptomatic phenomena, and that Holocaust memory is in turn an example of this phenomenon, is unquestionable, 48 and it has not been our purpose in this article to question it. The question instead is how the general process, the symptomatic phenomenon, and the example are to be understood. Our purpose has been to express doubt as to the claim that a new conceptual apparatus is required and that the existing one is vitiated by a defective methodological nationalism. We agree with Claire
Sutherland, who in a forthcoming book discusses the "cosmopolitan challenge," but notes that it does not imply the decline of either the nation state or nationalist ideology. 49 We have used the case of Germany, raised directly of course by the Holocaust memory example, to expand upon our theoretical objections with some empirical evidence. We will now summarize and restate our objections.
The thesis of "cosmopolitanization of reality" has as one of its implications the erosion of the nation-state "container" of social, political and cultural processes. The nation state is neither primordial nor eternal, empirically, and is indeed not exhaustive, analytically, so no a priori assumption that insisted that it is would be legitimate. Yet to allow the necessity of empirical investigation of this erosion process is far from justifying a conceptual shift away from the nation-state. The need for such a shift has been argued in the past, most famously by Karl Marx, and it is equally notorious that the blind spot created in the empirical gaze of Marxism became one of its chief weaknesses.
More recently, the empirical relevance of the nation state has been challenged by investigations under the heading of "multi-level governance." 50 This, too, has coupled a conceptual shift with a shift in empirical attention. But the shift from "government" to "governance" by which the decentering of the nation state is achieved in this case has also, like the conceptual revision we are discussing, concealed as much as it has revealed. The agenda of good governance, for example, is arguably an agenda that installs the interests of certain states over those of others, with the significant addition that the inequality is established covertly. For some states, more governance (for instance by the World Trade Organization, WTO) means less government, but for others the relationship is positive-sum, to the extent that their national interests are enhanced by the activities of the WTO and are indeed disproportionately influential in its policy. 51 The resulting inequalities and power differentials cannot be seen except with a lens that places the nation-state at its focal point.
The nation-state, and in particular its political leadership, though its journalists and commentators should not be ignored, remains a prime source of the imaginary that, by constituting the national community, maintains the nation state's own existence. This is no uniform fact, and is by all means subject to differentiation across space, but in this regard it would be particularly damaging to lose sight of the power differentials that are involved: to forget, for example, the difference between "universalism" and Europeanism has waned, the pursuit of its national interest has grown. As we have shown, this is increasingly underpinned by a new narrative of the nation which emphasizes positive aspects of German history. The national container is thus being replenished with a more usable past.
Beck and Sznaider assert that "even the re-nationalization or re-ethnification of minds, cultures and institutions has to be analysed within a cosmopolitan frame of reference". 52 The case of Germany if anything shows the reverse of Beck and
Sznaider's contention: that cosmopolitanization is most profitably analyzed within a national frame of reference.
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